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ABSTRACT 
Knowledge-based systems (XBSs) are in general use in a wide variety of domains, both commercial 
and government. As reliance on these types of systems grows, the need to assess their quality and 
validity reaches critical importance. As with any somare, the reliability of a KBS can be directly 
attributed to the application of disciplined programming and testing practices throughout the 
development life-cycle. However, there are some essential differences between conventional software 
and KBSs, both in construction and use. The identification of these differences affect the 
verification and validation (V&v) process and the development of techniques to handle them. The 
recognition of these differences is the basis of considerable on-going research in this field. For the past 
three years IBM (Federal Systems Company - Houston) and the Sofhyare Technology Branch (STB) 
of NASA/Johnson Space Center have been working to improve the "state of the practice'lin V&V of 
Knowledge-based systems. This work was motivated by the need to maintain NASA's ability to produce 
high quality software while taking advantage of new KBS technology. To date, the primary 
accomplishment has been the development and teaching of a four-day workshop on KBS V&V; With the 
hope of improving the impact of these workshops, we also worked directly with NASA KBSprojects to 
employ concepts taught in the workshop. This paper describes two projects that were part of this 
effort. In addition to describing each project, this paper describes problems encountered and solutions 
proposed in each case, with particular emphasis on implications for transferring KBS V&V technology 
beyond the NASA domain. 
BACKGROUND 
Before this project began, KBS V&V was the subject of several ongoing research projects and articles in 
popular trade journals. Much of this discussion and research was based on several conjectures about 
differences between KBS V&V and V&V of conventional software. These conjectures were based on 
theoretical arguments and limited personal experiences. However plausible these conjectures were, no 
systematic effort had been made to determine the extent to which they impacted industty's ability to deploy 
reliable KBSs. That is, there was no evidence that the state of the practice in KBS V&V needed any 
improvement. After all, many successful KBS systems had been developed and, presumably, verifred and 
validated in some fashion. 
To understand the state of the practice in KBS V&V, we performed an extensive survey of several KBS 
V&V projects within NASA, other government agencies, and commercial companies ( [5]) .  This survey 
validated the conjectures to some extent. It showed that deployed KBSs were generally less accurate or 
reliable than users and developers expected. We could not determine whether this was because the KBSs 
were of low quality or because expectations were unrealistically high. In either case, it pointed to a need to 
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better defme and meet accuracy and reliability requirements. More importantly, the survey indicated that 
the development of KBSs Mered significantly from generally advocated practices. For example, less than 
half of the projects had any form of documented requirements. There were also some indications that KBS 
V&V was of some difiiculty. For example, over sixty percent of the projects indicated that test coverage 
determination was a particular problem, but through follow-up interviews we learned that many were 
unfamiliar with existing test coverage techniques. The interviews also showed that many developers were 
domain experts with little programming experience; this may account for the unfamiliarity with 
traditional V&V approaches. 
Results from the survey were instrumental in providing direction for both long-term and near-term 
work in the V&V of KBS. Though the survey appeared to justify the need to research new methods for 
KBS V&V, it also pointed out the need to inform KBS developers about V&V methods that already 
existed. The near-term direction we chose was to train KBS developers both in known KBS V&V 
techniques and in conventional V&V techniques (many of which had been shown to be useful in KBS 
V&V, despite the differences between KBS and conventional software). We sought to educate KBS 
developers in a way that both convinced them of the importance of V&V and gave them some confidence 
through hands-on experience with techniques so they could effectively use them. This appeared to be the 
most immediate way to make a si@cant impact in the state of the practice in KBS V&V. 
We developed a four day workshop, teaching the underlying theory supporting V&V (i.e., why V&V is 
important), a wide-range of testing techniques, and a set of guidelines for applying these techniques. The 
material was based on a broad survey of V&V methods and was reviewed by several leading KBS V&V 
researchers. This material included:* 
a review of basic V&V concepts 
an explanation of the key differences between KBSs and conventional software 
a summary of over fifty V&V techniques 
examples, worksheets and guidelines for the techniques that were considered most useful 
an extensive set of references, cross referenced to each technique and concept 
* 
The workshop was taught several times to many NASA KBS developers. Although the results of the 
workshop have been very favorable (see [8]), the responsibility for applying the material taught lay 
entirely in the hands of the students. We contacted a small sampling of students several weeks after each 
course in an attempt to find out how well they were able to apply the material. By far, the most frequent 
answer was that they had not yet had an opporlunity to apply them. (Perhaps the reason that they were 
able to attend the class was that they were "in between" projects.) To improve the impact of the workshop, 
we looked for (and found) ongoing KBS projects within NASA that would be willing to apply concepts 
taught in the workshop. The remainder of this paper describes this work. 
PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS 
This section describes two projects within NASA that we worked with to develop a KBS V&V 
approach. Each project fit within different development organizations within mission operations (Space 
Shuttle and Space Station Freedom). The first group, called users, was composed primarily of flight 
controllers who develop applications to automate and assist flight control activities within the mission 
control center. The second group, facility developers, developed the mission control complex itself. This 
development included both development of the key parts of the mission control center and incorporation 
of users group applications as part of the control center baseline. We worked with one project from each 
of these groups. We worked with a users group that developed a monitoring application called the Bus 
Loss Smart System or BLSS. We also worked briefly with facility developers for the space station mission 
* See [6] and [7] for a discussion of the workshop contents. 
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control complex to develop criteria for assessing model-based user applications for inclusion into the 
control center baseline, This section gives insight into these projects by describing their environment, 
procedures and problems. 
OVERVIEW OF THE USERS GROUP 
In preparing to work with these groups, we taught a condensed (one day) version of the workshop to 
both flight controllers and application developers. There was a two-fold objective in teaching this 
workshop: (1) understand the kinds of problems they are working on and (2) teach them techniques 
that address those problems. Most of the problems they faced related directly to how these user 
applications are built. By this we mein that the basic development practices that support V&V were not 
practiced. We found that in most cases, the flight controller is the expert, developer and user. 
Inspections are viewed as being too expensive (both in dollars and time) and are, therefore, not done. 
Requirements were considered more of an enemy than a friend. For this reason, they rarely document 
the requirements that did exist. Their systems are viewed as prototypes, not as flight certified mission 
control applications. Becoming certified means that the application is added to the baselined set of 
mission control center applications. Few user applications had become certified. Testing emphasizes the 
functionality and user-interface aspects of their systems and not other important kinds of correctness such 
as safety and resource consumption. 
Based on this insight into their development environment, several techniques were presented to the 
group. Most of these focused on helping them spec@ what the system should do and how it should 
do it. The following list of techniques was presented: 
InSpeCti~ns ([18] and 121) 
Cause-Effect Graphing ([18], [19], [20] and [21]) 
State Diagrams (E23 I) 
- Decision Tables ([17]) 
Assertion Analysis ([lo]) - Object-oriented Analysis ([23], [ 111 and [26]) 
- Connectivity Graphs ([12] and [22]) 
Petri Nets ([22], [15] and [I]) 
Minimum Competency ([24] and [251) 
Pre/post Conditions ([4], [3], [14], [9] and [13]) * 
Bus Loss Smart System (BLSS) 
BLSS is a flight control application designed to monitor electrical equipment anomalies, loss or 
malfunction within key electrical systems onboard the orbiter. Since it was a prototype it only acted as an 
assistant to the flight controller in analyzing telemetry data sent from the orbiter to the ground 
Like most of the other flight control applications it was developed using G2. Schematics of the 
electrical systems were created using G2 graphics capabilities. When anomalies were discovered in the 
electrical system, the flight controller was noWied by BLSS via messages and highlighted items on the 
schematic. The flight controller then interacted with BLSS by indicating whether the anomaly should 
be ignored or further analysis was needed. BLSS then performed some deeper investigation into the 
anOmaly. 
Two primary methods were being used for testing BLSS. Both were system or "black-box" methods. 
With the first method, the flight controller supplied the programmer with simulation "scripts" (very 
much like operational scenarios). A simulation was then run based on this script to see that required 
outquts (as stated on the script) were generated. These simulations used actual telemetry data as supplied 
by the mission control complex 
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The second method was also a simulation, but not a simulation that uses telemetry data from the 
mission control complex. Instead, special rules were inserted into the knowledge-base that caused certain 
events to happen at specific times while running in G2 simulation mode. A series of ten or so of these 
special cases had been developed to test the system. If the system passed all of these special cases, then 
testing was considered to be done. 
FACILITY DEVELOPERS GROUP OVERVIEW 
The purpose of the "models assessment" effort was to capitalize on existing Space Station Freedom 
(SSF) advanced automation projects. In these advanced automation projects, prototype systems were 
built in order to prove or demonstrate the ability to automate SSF operations using advanced technology. 
These prototype systems were not intended to be used operationally ( i.e., the were not to be used directly 
by an SSF flight controller during actual flight operations). However, rather than building operational 
tools by completely re-implementing these systems, it was hoped that the prototypes could be turned into 
operational tools through additional development and/or additional V&V. 
Models Assessment 
The models were evaluated according to their usefulness and correctness. The usefulness of a prototype 
was judged by how well it met the needs of its target flight controllers. This involved more than just the 
functionality of the prototype. Issues such as usability were also considered. Judging the correctness of 
a prototype depended on its current level of correctness and the additional effort required to make the 
prototype sufficiently correct. Factors that impacted the assessment of correctness for a prototype were 
their lack of good requirements, their need to be stand-alone applications @e., the failure of one 
application should not aEect another), their required role and function (e.g., advisor fault detection, 
diagnosis, etc.) and the role of their experts (userdexperts may or may not be the developer). 
APPROACH 
Both projects had been studied in sufficient detail to define a V&V approach. In this section we 
describe our approach for each of these projects and the specific activities implementing that approach. 
Bus Loss Smart System. 
The most urgent need for the BLSS seemed to be to develop a good set of requirements that supported 
testing. The requirements that did exist lacked sufficient detail (i.e., they were very ambiguous) to 
support testing and maintenance. They also failed to address other important aspects of requirements 
such as safety, resource consumption, user profiles, etc.. Fortunately, most of the information needed for 
their requirements did exist. Our approach was to collect these requirements into a complete document 
based on DOD Std 2167A that would support testing. Our objective was to demonstrate the value of 
following standards and teach them how to write good requirements. 
To complement the DOD 2 167A format we provided the flight control group with a requirements 
handbook that describes the format of the document, the characteristics of good requirements, a step-by- 
step requirements definition method and a verification method for requirements. The approach we 
advocated was to define the overall goal of the system, the high-level tasks the system must perform 
(separated into competency and service tasks as discussed in [24] and [25]), user profiles, operational 
scenarios, and a state model for each task (see [4]). The tasks were then integrated through the definition 
of pre/post conditions and task invariants. Another urgent need for the BLSS was to have a good design 
specification that supported verification. The BLSS developers began defining this specification using an 
outline based on the DOD Std 2167A. We helped them incorporate a data dictionary based on the state 
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models described in both the requirements and the design along with pre/post conditions for each 
procedure in the implementation. We had also planned to help them use inspections as a way to increase 
the quality of these specifications. 
The last area where we are helped with BLSS was during user acceptance testing. This was different from 
the certification testing we described previously. This is primarily a "black-box" test activity performed 
by BLSS users to convince themselves that the system works. We had convinced them to use a statistical 
testing approach based on their simulation scripts. Simulation scripts were to be created that include 
at least one failure for each bus being monitored. The tester would keep track of the number of BLSS 
errors (based on severity - failing to identify a bus failure would be the most severe error) versus how 
long BLSS is in operation. Using these statistics we would apply a reliability model to quantify the 
quality of BLSS, in order to "certify" it. 
t S  
The BLSS development project had not yet been completed at the end of our consulting engagement. A 
draft requirements document and a draft design document had been developed but formal testing had not 
yet begun. Though they expressed great interest in the V&V approach that we had defined for them, it 
does not appear that they have continued following it as well as we had hoped. 
ss 
The general V&V approach defined for the Models Assessment was as follows. The first step was to 
develop requirements for each prototype. The requirements format developed for the BLSS project was to 
used as a base for a models assessment requirements format. Requirements were to be divided into 
requirements for evaluating prototype usefulness and requirements for evaluating prototype correctness. 
Initially, only the requirements supporting usefulness evaluation needed to be written. Then, ifthey were 
deemed useful, additional requirements would need to be documented to support evaluation of the 
correctness of the prototype. The initial requirements should include a description of the current 
operation of the system with emphasis on the problem(s) that the prototype was intended to address, the 
goals of the prototype (e.g., rapid diagnosis of faults or comprehensive identification of every possible 
failure condition) and a high-level description of the user interface to the system. This needed only be 
high level at this point, since the user would have the opportunity to interact with the tool and judge, 
firsthand, the usefulness of the interface. 
Once the prototype had been deemed useful, the more difficult task of assessing correctness would 
begin. At this point, the tool should no longer be considered a prototype because it is being "certified" 
for operational use. There are two major types of correctness to be considered: safety and minimal 
functionality. With regard to safety, we wanted to show that the failure of any application would not 
interfere with other control center applications. For minimal functionality we wanted to demonstrate 
that both minimal service and minimal competency requirements are satisfied. Competency requirements 
(see [24] and [25]) define the "knowledge" or "intelligent ability" of the system. Service requirements 
would be all requirements that were not competency requirements. These would include, but are not be 
limited to, input and output formats, response time, processor the tool should run on, etc.. 
The general approach for this phase of 
inspection, require the developer to verify the tool against the requirements, and then perform final 
validation via statistical testing. Statistical testing would involve running the tool in an operational 
environment for some period of time, recording any failures that might occur. This failure information 
will be used to predict an expect 
use. We considered measuring 
requirements. 
of the tool would be to validate the requirements by 
time in between failures (MTBF) of the system in operational 
s for safety, minimal service and minimal competency 
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Results 
Unfortunately, we did not have an opportunity to apply the approach because no prototype made it to the 
point of being assessed for correctness. The primary reason for this was that much of the SSF architecture 
had changed by the time the prototype was ready for evaluation. So the only assessment that could be 
made was whether the prototype was a useful automation demonstration. 
SURllMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
Although it is felt that the material and approaches developed in this project have great potential to 
improve the state of the practice in KBS V&V (and in all software V&V), the results to date have only 
been moderately successful at best. Our initial concern and risk was that projects would be unwilling to try 
a sophisticated V&V approach because of the perceived cost. This is because we were targeting KBS 
projects which tend to be small and follow a rapid development @e., prototyping) process. To mitigate 
this risk, we strove to develop a streamlined V&V approach that involved a small number of techniques 
that had the best costhenefit ratio (i.e., requirements and inspections) and/or directly addressed the 
problem of certification (i.e., statistical testing). The initial interest we received from the projects led us to 
believe that we were successful in this aspect. 
Another problem that we did not fully appreciate was the length of time that would be required for a 
project to become self sufficient in following an established V&V approach. Our consulting engagement 
needed to be much longer than the six to eight months that we had, so that we could have followed each 
project to successful conclusion of at least a first release of the system. 
A final problem in transferring technology to the target projects was the lack ofa defined and enforced 
process. KBS projects have historically been small and involve rapid, highly iterative, development. This 
is true of KBS projects inside and outside of NASA ( [5 ] ) .  (And it may be true for most software 
development projects outside of NASA.) Because of this, there was no way for our suggested V&V 
approach to be officially adopted and enforced beyond our consulting engagement. 
This project has important implications for the transfer of software engineering technology outside of 
NASA. NASA's software engineering methods and technology are among the best and NASA has a good 
reputation for building high quality software; therefore, NASA has much that could benefit others who do 
software development. However, many commercial projects are unlike the typical large, well-defined and 
safety critical NASA projects. KBS projects have many similarities with the typical commercial projects in 
that they are usually small, ill-defined applications that must be developed quickly. This does not 
necessarily imply that NASA's software technology is unsuitable for commercial projects. Because there is 
also a growing realization that more discipline and rigor is needed in many industries where software and 
KBSs are becoming key parts of safety critical systems, such as in medical devices. 
Just as traditional and well-accepted V&V methods had to be adapted to fit the KBS projects discussed in 
this paper, NASA's software engineering methods will need to be adapted to fit the commercial software 
development environment. But, as evidenced by the survey discussed in this paper, such methods do 
appear to be needed. Also, based on the experiences discussed in this paper, transferring these adapted 
methods will require a systematic concerted effort. Simply making the techniques available to interested 
commercial software developers, as we tried to do with our KBS V&V workshop, will liely have minimal 
impact. These conclusions are consistent with the experiences of other attempts to transfer software 
engineering technology, such as those reported in [9]. 
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